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TAX REBATE DISCOUNTING
IN CANADA:
THE CASE FOR ABOLITION

Martha Milczynski*

Each year, as people begin to collect their receipts in preparation for the
filing of their income tax returns, one cannot help but notice the proliferation of new store-front offices opening their doors for business. They not
only offer to sell their expertise in preparing the forms, but are anxious to
buy a customer's refund - at a discount.
Tax rebate discounting is not particularly new to the Canadian tax scene.
However, it is only in the past decade and a half that the practice has
become a widespread and lucrative business. Three out of every four taxpayers are entitled to a refund.' This is a potentially huge market that
is actively and aggressively sought out.
The tax rebate discounters that can afford large scale advertising, such
as H&R Block and BenTax, entice those expecting a refund. Their campaigns focus on the alleged long delays in waiting for a cheque from Revenue Canada and promise instant "hassle free cash". The barrage includes radio and television commercials, print media advertisements,
billboards and door to door leafletting. Naturally, the local enterprising entrepreneurs that operate as tax discounters seasonally, also benefit from the publicity.
It is the position of the author, however, that the business of tax rebate
discounting is socially unacceptable; it is a practice that preys upon
those who can least afford its services. Yet this practice has been legitimated by the federal government's own Tax Rebate Discounting Act S.C.
* Martha Milcznski is currently in her final year of the L.L.B. program at Os-

goode Hall Law School and wrote this paper for the intensive poverty law program at the law school while at Parkdale Community Legal Services in Toronto.
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1 Consumer and Corporate Affairs Canada, Tax Rebate Discounting, A Discussion Paper,(June, 1985) at 1.
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1978, c.25, a statute that imposes a 15% ceiling on the discount, but has,
in many respects, made the situation worse. The only solution to the
problem of tax discounting's intrinsic unconscionability and ineffective
regulation is its complete and total ban.
The following discussion will offer an overview of the development of
tax rebate discounting into a major industry, which in 1984, discounted re2
funds worth 275 million dollars and retained 41 million as its share.
This overview will attempt to establish the historical context of tax
discounting by beginning with a brief description of the situation before
the enactment of the federal law in 1978 and continue through to the current debate surrounding the proposed initiatives and changes to the Act
by the Minister of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Michel Cot6. It is
hoped that this exercise will help clarify the many considerations and
lead to what is suggested as the only rational and necessary conclusion.
PRE - 1978: AN HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
The early 1970's saw a dramatic increase, relative to previous years, in
the frequency with which people were relying on tax discounting to obtain their refunds. The reasons for this trend were attributed partly to
the general depressed state of the economy at that time. While in real
terms the numbers were still quite low, the horror stories across Canada
began to accumulate and attract media attention.
Yet the first victims of discounting were not taxpayers expecting a refund. In the late 1960's and early 1970's, particularly in Western Canada, discounting was available to anyone collecting unemployment insurance benefits. However, the practice of discounting unemployment insurance cheques was not tolerated for long. In 1972 the Unemployment Insurance Commission implemented regulations prohibiting the practice? In
1973 the idea was advanced in Parliament to take similar measures
against the tax discounter and the evidence in support of such a step began to mount.
The average discount rate applied to income tax refunds during those
years was approximately 50%, but the range ran anywhere from 40% to
90%. The "turn around" period, the time a discounter waited for the refund cheque from Revenue Canada was about two to three months. Tak-

2 Ibid.
3 Hansard,Question Period (7 March 1973).
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ing those two factors into consideration, one could take the discount rate
and express it is terms of an annual interest rate. Thus the tax rebate discounter was in effect charging at least 200%. Rates of 600-800% were not
uncommon and even a rate of 1200% had been reported. 4
Along with the discount rate some tax discounters charged additional
fees for preparation of the returns. Due to the lack of disclosure requirements, there were also incidents of fraud. Discounters would calculate an
artificially low refund before aquiring the right to the full refund from
the client and then, when filing, adjust the amount to the higher amount.
Even if this miscalculation occured inadvertantly, more often than not,
the discounter would pocket the difference.
Thus the image of the tax discounter as a "social vulture preying upon
the poor" was quickly and easily established. Newspapers like the Toronto Star, in April 1977, ran series of articles investigating the problem
and exposed the extent of the exploitation. Editorials on the subject also
made the point clearly, as in the Cape Breton Post on April 9, 1978:
"Calculated on a per annum basis, the astronomical interest rates would
make a seasoned gangster blush". This kind of increasing media attention and consumer and community pressure soon brought general calls for
legislative action.
PROVINCIAL RESPONSE
The response of the provinces to the problem varied both in scope and
intent. It ranged from total inaction to the passing of quite restrictive
measures limiting the practice of tax discounting to a bare minimum.
Some provinces amended existing consumer protection legislation, others
passed specific statutes addressing the tax rebate discounting issue.
Nova Scotia and Alberta instituted licencing and reporting measures and
compelled full disclosure, but did not regulate the rate of the discount.
Under its Consumer Protection Act, British Columbia required full disclosure and also legislated a minimum 85% "handback" to the taxpayer.
Ontario, Manitoba and Saskatchewan went further and set the minimum
handback at 95%. The then Minister of Consumer and Commercial Relations in Ontario, Larry Grossman, argued that the provisions were designed to be prohibitive and that he thought the tax discounter would
'be put virtually out of business" by Ontario's Income Tax DiscounterAct

4 The Toronto Star, April 29-30, 1977.
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S.O. 1977, c.55. s
Those intentions were not realized as the various schemes were difficult
to enforce and tax discounters found numerous loopholes.
For example, they continued to charge for tax return preparation or simply held back an extra portion of the refund arbitrarily. After some
time, the focus of the pressure demanding change shifted from the provinces to the federal government 6
FEDERAL LEGISLATIVE ACTION
THE PROPOSED
BORROWERS AND DEPOSITORS PROTECTIONACT 1976
Despite the protests from tax discounters themselves, who prefer to
characterize it as a sale transaction, the practice of tax rebate discounting has been generally viewed as a form of credit. The Borrowers
and Depositors Protection Act, (BDPA), was a complex and comprehensive set of reforms which never progressed beyond first reading. The bill
drew criticism from all sides of the House and was never actively pursued or supported. The proposals dealt with many issues, but with respect to tax discounting, the bill would have required full disclosure but
did not set a maximum discount rate. Instead it defined what would be
considered a criminal rate and "unwarranted credit rate charges".
It was intended that once the Act was passed, it would have the effect of
encouraging traditional consumer lenders (banks, trust companies, credit
unions) to service the market for tax discounting and approve loans on the
strength of expected tax refunds at the rate of normal consumer loans!
This hope for the participation of traditional financial institutions in
extending credit on such terms has survived but, as will be discussed, remains an unrealistic aim.
THE TAX REBATE DISCOUNTING ACT S.C. 1978, C.25
The federal government's abandonment of the BDPA had the immediate
effect of strengthening the calls for action with respect to tax rebate dis5 The [Toronto] Globe and Mail, (9 November 1977) 1.
6 Belobaba, "Regulating the Income Tax Discounter: A Study in Arbitrary Government" (1979) 1 Canadian Taxation 21.
7 Ibid.
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counting. There were fears that there would only be more study, discussion and delay. The government had heard evidence from tax discounters
themselves, through hearings concerning the repeal of the Small Loans
Act. Attempting to take both the discounters' interests and those of their
victims into consideration, on April 20, 1978, the Tax Rebate Discounting
Act was proclaimed.8
The major emphasis to the Tax Rebate DiscountingAct was on the minimum 85% hand back to the consumer and its stringent full disclosure requirements. In practice, the Act is adhered to as follows.9 A person must
take all their tax information slips to the tax discounter. She or he must
provide their social insurance number and written authorization to enable the discounter to contact Revenue Canada and check if there are any
problems, such as taxes owing. The discounter then prepares the return
and the customer signs an agreement or contract. This document is usually
drafted in the form of a purchase and sale agreement and includes the assignment of power of attorney over to the discounter limited to the nature
of the transaction.
Under the original legislation, the discounter was required to prepare a
detailed written statement of each transaction in the body of a Schedule
I form. A copy of Schedule I had to be provided to the taxpayer and another forwarded to the government. It also required that the discount
rate be expressed as a per annum interest rate, usually expressed as
62.8%, a rate that exceeds the penal limit imposed by the Criminal
Code, but enjoys exemption from its application.
The client then receives a cheque for at least 85% of the value of the full
refund. The 15% share for the discounter is all inclusive; there cannot be
any other additional charges for tax return preparation. The entire process can take as little as a few hours or up to two days.
The refund cheque remains payable to the taxpayer but is forwarded directly to the discounter. The discounter must advise the client in writing
of its receipt by completing and mailing a Schedule II form. It must show
the full amount of the actual refund cheque and any amount that the actual refund exceeds the original estimate. That difference must be paid
back to the customer in full.
In addition, the tax discounter must maintain full records and provide access to authorized persons of the Ministry of Consumer and Corporate Af8 Ibid
9 Supra., note 9 at 2.
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fairs, the Minister of the Crown of the Province and peace officers for the
purposes of examination and making copies. Failure to adhere to any of
the aforementioned requirements may make the discounter subject to liability upon summary conviction for a possible maximum fine of $25,000.00
The statutory limitation period for the commencement of prosecution
under the Act was set at six months.
THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE
It is not surprising that one of the first cases concerning the Tax Rebate
Discounting Act to make its way through the courts centred on its constitutionality. Krassman v.The Queen (1979), 102 D.L.R. (3d) 262 (Fed.Ct.)
dealt with an action brought by a discounter for a declaration that the
statute was ultra vires the Parliament of Canada and therefore void
and of no effect in law.
It was found that in pith and substance, the Act did not encroach upon
provincial jurisdiction over property and civil rights in the Province
(s.92(13) of the then British North America Act, 1867). Collier J.held
that the law was a valid exercise of Parliament's criminal law power.
He also noted that many provincial schemes existed and identified them
and their differences in comparison to the federal law. However, it did
not matter that they varied. He stated that "some of the provinces
have enacted their own legislation in respect of so called 'tax refund discounting'... the fact that some of the Provinces have concurrently legislated in respect of tax refund discounting neither detracts from nor enhances the rights of the federal power, in its criminal aspect, to enter
the field."'" He thus found that the Tax Rebate Discounting Act was
intra vires and did not necessarily exclude the constitutional viability
of independent provincial legislation.
THE PROVINCIAL RESPONSE II
The provinces' response to the federal Act was varied, but almost uniform was their willingness to allow the federal Ministry to carry the responsibility of enforcement. Eventually Manitoba and Saskatchewan
adjusted their legislation to correspond with the Act. British Columbia,
Alberta and Nova Scotia also adjusted the discount rate but maintained
some regulatory mechanisms to govern the licencing and reporting of dis-

10 Krassman v. The Queen (1979), 102 D.L.R. (3d) 262 (Fed. Ct.) at 266-7.
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counters. Quebec eventually took the bold step and banned the discounting of provincial tax refunds altogether. Ontario and Newfoundland, however, repealed their legislation concerning tax discounters then
in force. Ontario simply revoked its Income Tax DiscountersAct and left
nothing to allow licencing of tax discounters or the development of a cooperative arrangement with the federal Ministry for the reporting of
abuses.
THE JUDICIAL RESPONSE - ENFORCEMENT
As of January 1, 1979, responsibility for prosecutions under the Tax Rebate DiscountingAct lay with the Consumer Services Branch of the federal Ministry of Consumer and Corporate Affairs. Investigations and
commencement of actions proceed in response to complaints and random
spot checks. It seems to be quite difficult to bring abuses to the attention
of the Consumer Services Branch. The case of Ms. K., a client with Parkdale Community Legal Services, illustrates this point.
Ms. K. had her return prepared and refund discounted through a local
one-person business offering the service. This discounter failed to provide her either a proper Schedule I or II form. He showed her his calculations on the income tax return, indicating a refund of $1400, later revised to $400. Two months later, following her own suspicisions, she
learned from Revenue Canada that the tax discounter had in fact received her refund cheque in an amount over $2000. Ms. K. contacted the
police; following their investigation, the tax discounter was charged
with fraud under the Criminal Code. The police could only lay the one
charge because he did not keep records of previous transactions. Ms. K.
was concerned that he was carrying on his business and she called to complain to Revenue Canada.
When contacted by Parkdale C.L.S. some time later, the Consumer Services Branch had no knowledge of this case. Ms. K. could not help but
wonder why they had not been made aware of the discounter's gross violations of virtually every section creating an offence in the Act. The police knew nothing of the special prosecutorial regime and it would seem
neither did Revenue Canada. The obvious question is how is a consumer
to enjoy the benefit of the minimum protection afforded by the Act?
Most people would not think to go to the Consumer Services Branch of
Consumer and Corporate Affairs, rather they would seek the assistance
of the police or Revenue Canada.
The above example serves to illustrate the problems of pursuing less obvious infractions. When asked how many prosecutions had been commen-
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ced under the statute since its enactment, an official with the Ministry
replied that the number of prosecution cases was twenty three. This figure includes those who were prosecuted more than once. Thus the actual
number of discounters brought to trial is significantly less than twenty
three."
This official also commented on the weakness of the Act. Many discounters do not report their Schedule I documents as they are required to by
the Act, yet in the words of the official, "the ones that aren't reporting
are the ones we can't monitor". He also noted that most of the abuses are
committed by the smaller discounters operating within a particular market. For example, in the case of Ms. K., she does not speak English and
entrusted her return to a local Polish speaking tax discounter whom she
thought she could trust.
Two of the few reported decisions considering the Tax Rebate Discounting Act are especially interesting to note with respect to the Act's
unenforceability and lack of deterrence. In R. v. Takiff (1983), 49 N.B.R.
(2d) 203 (N.B. Q.B.) a discounter was accused of seventeen offences. Each
charge was the same, that he witheld the excess amount of actual refund
over and above the estimate he had calculated. The discounter was
found guilty and sentenced as follows. On twelve counts, a fine was imposed of $75 or seven days in jail, plus restitution; on four counts, a fine of
$25 or two days in jail, plus restitution and on one count he was given an
absolute discharge. The Crown appealed the sentence and the accused
cross-appealed on the conviction.
The Crown argued in favour of a higher fine in the basis of the need for
punishment of this defendant and the deterrence of others. This tax discounter had been fined $25 on six similar charges in 1979 and $15 each on
fifty seven charges in 1980. However, Mr. Justice Meldrum thought it
more relevant, and noted with some sympathy, that this discounter was
seventy two years old, of Lithuanian extraction and ran a small grocery
store in a poorer area of Moncton. Meldrum J. dismissed both the appeal
and cross-appeal.
In R. v. Bowes (1983), 5 W.W.R. 374 (Alta. Q.B.), the tax discounter came
under investigation by the R.C.M.P. and had 250 files seized. Once some
discrepancies were revealed, she made full restitution and pleaded
guilty to the six charges made against her under the Act. Those six
11 Conversation with Rick Wajewada, December, 1985; other conversations

held with Ministry officials, Dora Koop and Marion Clark in November and December, 1985.
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counts totalled $3,114 owed among six clients, but there were additional
instances of possible violations that were not put into issue, that totalled
$10,458, but which she also paid out. This tax discounter was fined
$15,000 on the six counts but she appealed her sentence. It was held on
appeal that the trial judge erred because he considered more than the six
charges before him. On appeal, the fact that she made restitution, cooperated with the police and had an excellent reputation in the community
weighed more in her favour and the fine was reduced to $3,000.
In the Bowes case the judge made a point of likening the offence of violating the Tax Rebate Discounting Act, not to theft or fraud, but to tax
evasion, without giving sound reasons for the rationale of such an analogy. The comparison suggests that tax evasion is not serious or offensive in
itself. It is difficult to comprehend the basis for the comparison at all,
and this confusion is perhaps a further indication of how legislative action and the judiciary have failed to adequately deal with offences committed by businesses.
It was perhaps fortunate then, that in the case of Ms. K., the police did
not turn the matter over to the Consumer Services Branch. The point being that criminal prosecution could, at the very least, influence a change
in the perception of tax discounters' abuses; unfortunately this was not
put to the test.
The defendant had not adhered to any of the full disclosure requirements
of the Act. The income tax return he presented to Ms. K. was not the same
as the one he filed with Revenue Canada. The discrepancies involved
the final amount and the way the refund was calculated. For example,
since Ms. K. is a sole support mother, he had the option of using the dependent child deduction or the marriage equivalent schedule. He used
the latter on the return to Revenue Canada as it yielded a higher refund
which he retained. Ms. K. later requested some proof of the actual refund he received, but he made excuses. Only when she learned for herself what the refund was and confronted him did he, reluctantly, finally
pay the balance.
Despite all this, on the day of the trial, the Crown attorney withdrew
the charge of fraud on the ground that there was no intent to defraud.
The Crown took into consideration that this tax discounter was elderly,
had a language problem (his first language was Polish) and that he
seemed to have made a mistake, which he corrected. The indication
from this end result is, however, that there is little promise in holding
the tax discounter accountable through either the Tax Rebate Discounting Act or even the Criminal Code.
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USING THE TAX DISCOUNTER - THE CURRENT SITUATION
When the statute was enacted in 1978, the reaction from the discounters
was swift. They claimed that they needed at least a 30% share of the
refund to break even and that the effect of the Act would be to force them
out of business. This has not proved to be the case. In fact, the exact opposite became the reality; tax discounting became a booming growth industry.
In 1979 the number of reported discounting transactions was 7000. In 1981
that number rose to 61,500 and in 1984 it grew to 385,000. The share taken
by discounters also kept pace, in 1981, discounters grossed 6.5 million dollars; in 1984 their share was 41 million dollars.'
There are two major businesses discounting. The largest, H&R Block, is
an American owned company that entered the discounting market only
three years ago. In 1983, it had 29 offices across Canada; it now boasts
800.13 In 1984 over half the discounting transactions were completed by
H&R Block. Another third of the business was taken by BenTax, a division of a Canadian subsidiary of another American firm, Beneficial Finance. It is interesting to note that the United States itself banned the
practice of tax discounting in 1976.
BenTax began operating in Canada in 1979 and Mr. Wallace Harrigan,
assistant tax director for Beneficial Canada has said that his firm will
4
only discount the simplest returns and not the more complicated ones.
This gives a very clear indication of the market they are seeking to service. Two out of every three people who discounted had incomes of below
$8,000. Over half of the people who discounted were recipients of the
Child Tax Credit, a figure which represents about 15-20 million dollars
for the tax discounter. 5
Tax returns have become a means of delivery for a variety of social programs. In addition to the Child Tax Credit, people may be eligible to
take advantage of Provincial Tax Credits, Sales Tax and Renters's Tax
Credits. It should be appreciated as a simple matter of principle that
this money and any refund due through overpayment of taxes ought to be
paid in full to the person so entitled. 6 Aside from the very nature of the
12 Hansard, Question Period (22 December 1982).

13 Supra, note 1 at 3.
14 Globe and Mail (9 March 1984).
15 Press Release, Consumer and Corporate Affairs - Canada (November, 1985).
16 Hasson, "In Defense of Simple Solutions for Simple Problems - A Reply"

(1979) 1 Canadian Taxation, at 25-7.
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practice, the need for discounting is questionable. Revenue Canada has
issued simpler forms for less complicated returns and processing has been
greatly speeded up.
It would seem that the legislation passed in 1978 to fight the situation of
rampant profiteering, has had the effect of not only legitimating the
practice of tax discounting, but has encouraged its expansion. From the
time of its enactment, the Tax Rebate Discounting Act has attracted criticism. Media attention continued to focus on the exploitation and inherent injustice of the practice, in particular with respect to the discounting
of the Child Tax Credit. Clearly a portion of the money was going into
the wrong hands. In addition, there were the continuing problems of
abuse and enforcement. As the attention remained on tax discounting, it
became clearer that government created the problem and something
needed to be done.
CONSULTATION
The Ministry of Consumer and Corporate Affairs released its discussion
paper on tax rebate discounting in June, 1985. It gave a brief historical
overview of discounting in Canada and presented the many options open
for consideration. According to Marion Clark of the Ministry of Consumer
and Corporate Affairs, by fall the Ministry received close to seventy submissions from organizations and private individuals. The range of opinion, however, was not that great and the following discussion of two
briefs is representative of the entire debate that essentially fell within
the two camps.
THE CANADIAN TAX REFUND DISCOUNTERS ASSOCIATION
The formation of the Association in 1985 seems to have been a defensive
move on the part of tax discounters in reaction to the increasing negative
publicity to their business. Their president is Mr. Thomas Caporale,
Vice President of Beneficial Finance Canada. Their rather lengthy brief
is a defence of the Tax Rebate Discounting Act and justification for the
current practice. The few changes they do propose only serve to further
legitimate the status quo.
The Association's argument is based on the assumption that tax refund
discounting is a necessary public service for those with an urgent need for
cash, particularly for those unable to obtain financial assistance elsewhere. The brief explains that to meet this need, tax discounters are
willing to risk the start up cost and engage in "substantial preparation".
Yet in reality it is not that difficult to set up operations. For almost all

(1987), 2 Journal of Law and Social Policy

of the smaller tax discounters, the practice is merely a profitable sideline. In Ontario, a discounter need only have the proper schedule forms
printed, arrange financing and obtain a discounter registration number.
The brief, however, goes so far as to claim that "discounters are in fact
using their good credit rating... to borrow money from financial institutions and to, in turn, provide cash to people that the financial institutions would not even consider for a loan.., or a credit card". 7
Other reasons they offer in support of tax discounting that, in their eyes,
also explain its popularity are the following:
- For those desiring the highest possible return, the tax discounter is a trained tax preparer,
- People fear and wish to avoid postal delays and delays
from Revenue Canada,
- People fear Revenue Canada and are intimidated by any
contact with the department,
- In particular, new immigrants fear deportations or jail for
errors on their returns,
- Some people experience difficulty in cashing government refund cheques,
- Others have a transient lifestyle and don't know where
they will be when the cheque is issued,
- People consider the "utility cost" of money and use the discounter to obtain their refund for R.R.S.P. and R.H.O.S.P. contributions,
- Some people are simply unable to prepare the returns themselves, a point to which the brief adds that one third of all
Canadian are functionally illiterate.
In addition to making some inherently offensive statements and allusions, the Association's brief and the preceding list make numerous factually suspect assertions. First the government and postal delays, that
discounters wish to protect the public from, are greatly exaggerated. The
processing, issuance and delivery of refund cheques has been greatly expedited in recent years. Second, it is unconscionable that discounters be
permitted to rely on and promote misinformation and fear to attract cus17 The Canadian Tax Refund Discounters Association, "Position Paper on Tax
Rebate Discounting" (May 1985) at 8.
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tomers from immigrant communities. The discounter and government silence about the truth on this point leads only to a reinforcement of those
fears. Third, rather than being exploited, those unable to complete the
forms, should be provided with a greater availability of free and accessible assistance. Furthermore, the data concerning the income level of
people turning to tax discounters does not support their claim about middle class individuals saving for their first home or golden years. Such
individuals are able to obtain short term loans from traditional lending
institutions for such expenditures. Finally the brief also states that
there is an active illegal black market of tax discounters in Quebec and in
the United States, a statement for which they offer no proof.18
Their suggestions for change to the Act are minimal. It would seem tax
discounters have adjusted quite well to the requirements they once so
vehemently protested. They proposed to maintain the current 15% discount rate but allow the collection of more than 85% in the event of shortages not paid originally by the taxpayer. The discounters would also
have liked to see the elimination of the expression of the discount rate
as a per annum interest rate and requested that they only be compelled to
forward any excess refund received from Revenue Canada if the amount
exceeds $10.
Despite all the arguments and observations, it is neither a convincing nor
logical conclusion that because people use tax discounting there is a genuine need for its continued existence, particularly when that percentage in
reality stems from fear and misinformation. The exploitation of people
who can ill afford to have their few resources diminished cannot and
must not be justified by a thinly veiled appeal to freedom of choice and a
free market economy.
NATIONAL ANTI POVERTY ORGANIZATION
The National Anti Poverty Organization (NAPO) is made up of approximately 160 community based groups. It is a non-profit, voluntary, charitable organization that represents the interests of the poor in Canada.
NAPO recognized tax rebate discounting as a problem, and in 1982 began
to concentrate its efforts for change. Their submission to the Minister is
only the most recent endeavor in this regard. The following is a summary

18 Recent government statistics have shown, however, a dramatic increase in
the number of discounting transactions in Quebec, reinforcing the need for uniform federal action.
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of NAPO's position on tax discounting, a position with which this paper
concurs
The Tax Rebate Discounting Act was not enacted in response to the demands by consumers to have access to such a service. The "demand" came
later, after the Act had the effect of establishing and officially sanctioning tax discounting as a form of financial service. The Act was originally designed to dispense with the scattered "fly by night" operations
charging astronomical rates. It was only after 1979 that the large companies with substantial advertising budgets entered into and effectively
took over the market. Thus it was the passage of the Tax Rebate Dis-"
counting Act that fuelled the growth of tax discounting and essentially
caused many of the problems.
NAPO describes tax discounting as a form of exploitation without any redeeming attributes or benefits. Its customers are among the most poor and
vulnerable in our society. It is a business that not only benefits from others' financial problems, it truly thrives on them.
Tax discounting does nothing to assist those in need; it only offers them
less than what is due them at a charge that is usurious. This charge, expressed even at its minimum, usually exceeds the per annum limit in the
Criminal Code, which but for the Tax Rebate DiscountingAct would be
subject to criminal prosecution.
As mentioned previously, tax discounting takes money from what are in
effect social programs. Almost half of tax discounters' incomes came from
the Child Tax Credit alone. And not taken into account in the discussion
paper, are the many Provincial Tax Credits that should also be considered. NAPO's point is that those programs are being subverted by tax
discounting and that the government has an obligation to ensure that all
the money makes its way to the intended recipients.
In its brief, NAPO proposed a total prohibition of tax discounting and rejected the consideration of "half measures" such as lowering the cost of
discounting. Such alternatives would not solve the problem but remain
contrary to the fundamental notion that the practice is inherently unjust
and undesirable.
Recommendations that parallelled NAPO's proposal came from within
the machinery of government itself. Representatives of all three parties
who sat on the House Standing Committee on Health, Welfare and So19 "Tax Rebate Discounting", National Anti Poverty Organization, (August,
1985).
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cial Affairs were clear in their report tabled in April, 1985, on the issue
of tax rebate discounting;
"...
the

Child Tax Credit has encouraged the growth of tax discounters.
Pursuant to the Tax Rebate Discounting Act discounters are allowed to
charge 15% for their services. We do not want money which helps provide for the needs of families diverted to tax discounters. We feel that
15% is an exorbitant rate of return for the risks discounters take in advancing refunds to low income families. We strongly urge that the federal
government in consultation
with the provincial governments outlaw tax
20
rebate discounting."
In light of the arguments and concerns that NAPO, the Standing Committee, the media and other organizations had raised, it was a great
disappointment, when after his "consultation", on November 21, 1985,
the Hon. Michel Cot6 announced his proposed changes to the Tax Rebate
Discounting Act. For months, up until that date, the Minister had deflected questions in the House concerning his plans.
REFORM OR CAPITULATION?
The Minister refused to implement an outright ban of tax discounting arguing that although the practice was indeed costly to the poor, it was
necessary to protect freedom of choice for those individuals who wanted
to use the service. Instead, he presented a five point package of
"initiatives" to reform the system.
The "reforms" do little to address the injustices of tax rebate discounting.
To appreciate their true lack of concern for the issues, it is necessary to
look closer at each and discover the extent of the government's committment to change and analyze the shortcomings.
1) "Discounters will retain the 15% rate on the first $300 of a
refund. The maximum allowable rates will be reduced to 5%
on any payment over $300. The discount rate will continue to
include the preparation cost of a return."
This proposal does not solve the problem of usurious interest rates that
will continue to be applied and expressed by the discount rate. They far
exceed that normally charged for loans negotiated through traditional
lending institutions and with respect to the clients of tax discounters, the
20 Standing Committee on Health, Welfare and Social Affairs, Consultation
Paper Respecting Child and Elderly Benefits, (April, 1985).

(1987), 2 Journal of Law and Social Policy
poor will continue to be exploited. Lowering the cost slightly for those
expecting refunds in excess of $300 is not a solution and can hardly be considered a compromise reached in the best interests of all parties concerned.
2) "Procedures for administering the Act will be improved."
The statutory limitation period for prosecutions under the Tax Rebate
Discounting Act will be extended from six months to two years. There
will also be specific provisions in the Act to prohibit the discounter from
giving false or misleading information. The discounter will have to provide the customer with the notice of assessment from Revenue Canada
and a true copy of the return upon request. Revenue Canada's own role is
to be expanded to permit the reporting of the mailing of many refund
cheques to a single address. This would be followed through with a cross
check to see if there was a discounting number registered for that address.
There are no proposed improvements to facilitate the enforcement of the
Act nor are there plans to establish channels to report abuses or complaints. While any direct regulatory or licencing scheme might be beyond the jurisdiction of Parliament, it could be suggested to provinces
like Ontario who have been remiss in this regard. Alternatively, some
campaign to inform consumers of the existence of the Consumer Services
Branch might have been appropriate.
3) "The government plans to implement periodic payment of
the Child Tax Credit, thereby eliminating the need and opportunity to discount it. The Ministers of Finance, Revenue
and Health and Welfare are reviewing the technical issues."
On the face of it, this appears to be a thoughtful reform and a major concession to tax discounting's critics. However, it means that the government has had to formulate and implement a new administrative and bureaucratic system of payment. As of this year, the bulk of the Child Tax
Credit will be paid in a lump sum in the fall of each year thereby removing it from the income tax return and the discounters' grasp. However,
aside from encumbering an already complex system, the proposal raised
an important question that brings into focus the farce of the consultation
process and its half-hearted attempt at compromise.
If the Minister is willing to accept there is something wrong or unjust
with discounting the Child Tax Credit, why does he not recognize the
logical inconsistency in permitting the discounting of other tax credits or
in the over payment of taxes as a whole? Was it from some sense of decency or only for appearance's sake that, because the Child Tax Credit
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represented so large a portion of the discounters' income, M. Cot6 conceded and opted for a politically expedient solution?
4) "Simplified procedures will make it easier for financial
institutions to advance loans at normal rates on the strength
of anticipated income tax refunds."
The government has written to banks, trust companies and credit unions
offering them the same access to Revenue Canada's files as the tax discounter. Presumably this would allow those institutions to conduct a
check of a taxpayer to determine whether or not to issue the loan. It assumes of course that these institutions would be interested in doing so which they are not. Some credit unions have indicated an interest, but
trust compaies and banks in particular have resisted the government's invitation for years. Ms. Dora Koop of the Ministry has admitted that
this latest effort did not find them any more receptive now than in the
past. The banks simply do not want to get involved. In fact, to her
knowledge, Ms. Koops knows of only one branch of a bank in all of Canada that has done so. A Royal Bank branch in Winnipeg, Manitoba has
negotiated loans on such terms. This branch made its decision in response
to heavy local pressures and it was the decision of the branch manager
alone. It is difficult then to understand what effect, if any, this
"initiative" will have.
5) "Information on the true costs of discounting and its alternatives will be provided to taxpayers."
The true cost of discounting will, however, be obscured; the Schedule I
form need not express the ususal 62.8% per annum interest rate. Due to
the varying number of weeks for refund processing and the 15%-5% discount split, that figure is no longer accurate, (in fact it may be too low).
In its place, H&R Block for example has provided an almost incomprehensible formula by which the consumer is to calculate his/her own per
annum interest rate.
As for information on discounting's alternatives, Ms. Koop explained
that Revenue Canada and Supply and Services have improved their
record in processing returns in the past few years; there is less delay and
they hope to make this fact more well known. Thus, according to the
Ministry, the alternative to discounting is waiting, a fact that most likely did not escape the minds of those people currently using tax discounting services.
Ms. Koop also hopes that there would be more public awareness of the
availability of free tax preparation in many areas, but did not specify if
the Ministry of Consumer and Corporate Affairs intended some action in
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this regard.
It was within federal competence to prohibit tax rebate discounting by
making it an offence to do so. It continues to be the best course of action,
but one M. Cot6 chose not to consider seriously. Rather, it is submitted
that his suggestions show a callousness and lack of concern. His initiatives will not bring about meaningful change, but protect an industry that
should not exist at all. He has shown that he prefers to spend more of
the taxpayers' money and time in trying to devise an alternative mode of
delivery for the Child Tax Credit payment to the exclusion of other tax
credits and the refund overpayments. All of this is money that the government should be seeking to ensure reaches its proper place in full.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
It is the position of the author that the practice of tax rebate discounting
is socially unacceptable. The industry creates its own demand, it exploits the poor and it exploits fear. There are no benefits, social or economic, to be gained from discounting, except for those who profit from it.
Discounting takes money from those who need it, by charging usurious
rates and diverting money from social programs. By taking their customers' money, tax discounters do not perform them a service, they only reinforce their impoverishment and powerlessness.
If the above position is accepted, there can be only one conclusion and
that is the necessity for the total prohibition of tax discounting. Alternatives and compromises are ineffective, difficult to enforce and, ultimately, do not begin to address the fundamental injustice of the practice.
The Minister's justification, for discounting's continued existence, under
the guise of freedom of choice in the market, is only an insult that ignores the history and development of discounting in Canada. M. Cot6
may view his initiatives as reforms but closer examination reveals their
true nature, a defence of ongoing state legitimation of institutionalized
loan sharking.
Despite the announcements, pressure must be maintained on the federal
government to revise its position. These energies directed to the federal
level should not, however, be to the exclusion of the Provincial Legislatures. In particular, more concerted effort is needed to lobby the Ontario
Legislature to take action. The current political climate there is more
sympathetic and recently Queen's Park passed a resolution unanimously
condemning the practice of tax discounting. Thus the Minister of Consumer and Corporate Relations, Monte Kwinter, should be persuaded to
take a more active role in calling upon the federal government to institute a ban.
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The other option is, of course, that Ontario follow Quebec in legislating
its own prohibition. Although possible, province by province legislation
is not the most desirable course of action. It might prove costly and not be
as effective as an outright federal ban.
Unfortunately, M. Cot6's "reforms" pose something of a setback and they
are the current reality to be addressed. It may be some time before the
federal government is moved to act again, and then only following more
study and further consultation. The Conservative government most likely feels that it has done its job and will withdraw to take a more complacent posture.
Thus a province by province approach may be the only solution and in
light of Ontario's recent overtures, may be the one that is readily available. Given that the federal government has removed the Child Tax
Credit from the income tax return, the Legislatures' prohibition of the
discounting of provincial tax credits would have the resulting effect of a
de facto ban on all discounting, by making it financially unviable.
The abolition of private, profit oriented tax discounting, by either Parliament or the Legislature is only a first step. It is also necessary to come
to terms with discounting's popularity and the fact that its clientele
may need and want their expected refund immediately. It is particularly important for those with no other or few resources and lack of credit.
Recognizing the apparent demand and need for a speedy refund is not, as
the discounters and M. Cot6 would have us believe, a justification for the
current system. Rather, one can accept its repugnant nature and move on
to the more rational and logical solution. It is common sense that since it
is the government that has witheld an overpayment of taxes or made a
decision on the delivery scheme of certain entitlements, it is incumbent on
the government to ensure its effective and just realization.
Those people expecting a refund who fall below a pre-determined level
of income should be accommodated. There is no reason why the state
should not take over the discounters' function and provide quick "hassle
free" cash by honouring 100% of their debt to the individuals or families
concerned. Either level of government could fill in the gap left by the departure of existing tax discounters, at a minimal cost.
The location of such services does not pose a problem. Existing public offices such as the U.I.C. and Employment offices and even the Post Office
would serve the purpose. There are also provincial welfare, community,
and social services offices that could participate in a program that
would involve them for only two or three months per year. The exact nature of the service provided could be a strict cheque writing scheme or in-
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volve assistance in the preparation of income tax returns. The latter
would not prove onerous, as most returns meeting the eligibility criteria
are uncomplicated.
The proposal is a modest and simple one. It would meet current demand
without the current injustice and would lay to rest any fears of black market discounting that might exist if a ban were to be effected without the
implementation of the necessary alternative that is the duty of the state
to provide.
The question of which level of government ought to provide this service
is not a contentious one at this time. It is only too clear that Parliament
and in particular the Conservative Cabinet will not change its position.
The task thus falls to the provinces and in the case of Ontario, the current opportunities to successfully mobilize and work for qualitative
change should not be ignored.
The argument is straightforward. Tax rebate discounting in its current
form, for profit, is an unconscionable practice. The minimum standard
prescribed by the Tax Rebate Discounting Act does not provide any
meaningful remedy or change that inherent character. The statute and
M. Cot 's reforms are inadequate and unenforceable. They have, and continue to, legitimate and encourage a parasitic industry. In the absence of
concern and political will in Ottawa, the focus for reform lies with the
Provincial Legislatures to prohibit tax discounting in the private sector
and in its place implement programs to provide the service themselves.

